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Abstract
To demarcate the limits of experimental knowledge we probe the limits of what might
be called an experiment. By appeal to examples of scientific practice from astrophysics
and analogue gravity, we demonstrate that the reliability of knowledge regarding certain
phenomena gained from an experiment is not circumscribed by the manipulability or
accessibility of the target phenomena. Rather, the limits of experimental knowledge are
set by the extent to which strategies for what we call ‘inductive triangulation’ are available:
that is, the validation of the mode of inductive reasoning involved in the source-target
inference via appeal to one or more distinct and independent modes of inductive reasoning.
When such strategies are able to partially mitigate reasonable doubt, we can take a theory
regarding the phenomena to be well supported by experiment. When such strategies are
able to fully mitigate reasonable doubt, we can take a theory regarding the phenomena
to be established by experiment. There are good reasons to expect the next generation
of analogue experiments to provide genuine knowledge of unmanipulable and inaccessible
phenomena such that the relevant theories can be understood as well supported.
1 Introduction
It is somewhat of a platitude to say that experiments allow us to gain knowledge about the
world. Indeed, an experiment, in and of itself, may not allow us to gain any knowledge. Consider
a measurement of negative temperature with a faulty digital thermometer or the infamous
detection of neutrinos moving at superluminal speed at OPERA. In and of itself, an experiment
need not teach us anything, even about the system that is being directly manipulated. For us to
gain knowledge from an experiment it must be the case that the experiment is validated. Two
distinct forms of experimental validation are differentiated by the object system about which we
are justified in believing we have gained knowledge. An internally valid experiment justifies our
beliefs about a source system, which is directly manipulated in the experiment. An externally
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valid experiment justifies our beliefs about a target system, which is not directly manipulated
in the experiment. Typically the internal validity of a given experiment is necessary but not
sufficient for the external validity of that experiment.
What kinds of target systems can we gain knowledge about? And what factors place limits
on the strength of this knowledge? In particular, must target systems be, in principle, them-
selves manipulable? Or should we insist that they are at least accessible, in the sense of being
subject to possible observation? In this paper we will argue that the limits of experimental
knowledge should not be taken to be circumscribed by the manipulability or accessibility of
target systems. There is no, in principle, epistemic barrier to experiments with unmanipulable
or inaccessible target systems being externally valid. Experiments in contemporary science can
and do allow us to gain knowledge of unmanipulable and inaccessible target systems. We will
argue that the limits of experimental knowledge are in fact set by the mitigation of reasonable
doubt – that is, the application of inductive strategies for internally and externally valid source-
target inferences. When reasonable doubt has been partially mitigated, a theory can be said to
be well supported, and a scientist is justified to treat the empirical consequences of the theory
as likely to be true, in the relevant domain. When reasonable doubt has been almost entirely
mitigated a theory can be said to be established, and a scientist is justified to treat the empirical
consequences of the theory as true, in the relevant domain. Our key contention is that whether
a theory regarding certain phenomena can be well supported or established by experiment is
not constrained by the requirement that the target system displaying these phenomena be ma-
nipulable or accessible, either in principle or practice. Thus, theories regarding unmanipulable
and inaccessible phenomena can in principle become established via experiment. On our view,
the limits of experimental knowledge are set by the extent to which strategies for inductive
triangulation are available: that is, the validation of the mode of inductive reasoning involved
in the source-target inference via appeal to one or more distinct and independent modes of
inductive reasoning.
To demarcate the limits of experimental knowledge we will probe the limits of what might
be called an experiment. In particular, we will illustrate our arguments by drawing upon
examples from astrophysics and analogue gravity. In our astrophysics case study, we examine
stellar nucleosynthesis. We take an instance of a nuclear process in the stellar core to be an
example of an unmanipulable and (at least partially) inaccessible target phenomenon, modern
theories of which we take to be uncontroversially established by conventional experiment. The
second, more controversial, example we will consider is analogue experiments designed to probe
the phenomenon of Hawking radiation. There are good reasons to expect the next generation
of such analogue experiments to provide genuine knowledge of unmanipulable and inaccessible
phenomena such that the relevant theories can be understood as well supported. Furthermore,
looking further to the future, inductive triangulation allows for the possibility of analogue
experiments to play a role, when combined with appropriate conventional experimental results,
in establishing new theories.
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2 Epistemology and Experiment
2.1 Reasonable and Unreasonable Doubt
An ampliative inference is one in which the conclusion goes beyond what is (logically) entailed
by the premises: it is not logically necessary that the conclusion is true given the truth of the
premises. Inductive inferences can be defined as the set of all inferences that are ampliative.
All empirical science is evidently based upon inductive inference (usually in combination with
deductive inference). The Scottish Enlightenment philosopher David Hume (Hume, 2016) fa-
mously identified the problem of finding a non-circular justification for inductive reasoning,
known as ‘the problem of induction’. Hume argued that inductive reasoning must always as-
sume that instances of which we have had no experience must resemble those of which we have
had experience. This in turn relies upon the ‘principle of the uniformity of nature’, according to
which there is similarity or resemblance between observed and unobserved regularities in nature
(Henderson, 2019). This regularity can take the form of temporal uniformity (past phenomena
resemble future phenomena), spatial uniformity (local phenomena resemble distant phenom-
ena), and intra-type uniformity, by which we mean between different tokens of the same type
(these electrons resemble other electrons). Hume’s crucial observation was that in justifying
all such forms of uniformity in nature we inevitably require further inductive reasoning. We
are thus required to engage in a circular form of reasoning in justifying induction via induction
itself.
Within the vast literature on the problem of induction (Salmon, 1963; Sober, 1991; Okasha,
2001, 2005; Norton, 2003; Henderson, 2019) one line of response will be of particular relevance
for our discussion. The response (van Cleve, 1984; Papineau, 1992) centres on the idea that
we can distinguish between two notions of circularity to dissolve Hume’s problem: premise
circularity and rule circularity (Braithwaite, 1953; Psillos, 2005; Bird, 2010; Douven, 2017).
Premise circularity (or begging the question) occurs when the conclusion of an argument is
explicitly listed amongst the premises. Premise circular arguments are always viciously circu-
lar, in the sense that putting forward a premise circular argument always involves making an
informal fallacy of reasoning. Moreover, premise circular arguments are always dialectically
ineffective in that they cannot be deployed to rationally convince an opponent of the truth of
their conclusion. If Hume had shown that any inductive justification of induction were premise
circular, then there would be a serious problem. However, so the counter-argument goes, in
fact the justification of induction is properly thought of as rule circular rather than premise
circular, and rule circularity is not always vicious. Rule circularity arises when one employs an
argument to establish a proposition concerning a rule, such as its reliability, and the relevant
argument-form towards the proposition is an instance of that same rule. An argument for the
reliability of a given rule that essentially relies on the rule as an inferential principle is not
viciously circular, provided that the use of the rule does not guarantee a positive conclusion
about the rule’s reliability. That is, rule circular arguments towards the reliability of a given
rule do not constitute informal fallacies of reasoning (analogous to begging the question) unless
they make their own reliability a sure thing. We can therefore see that rule circular induc-
tive inferences cannot by definition be viciously rule circular since, as ampliative inferences,
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they cannot guarantee a positive conclusion about their own reliability. The crucial question
is then whether the inductive justification of induction is dialectically ineffective or not. That
is, granted that it cannot be viciously rule circular, there is still the question of whether an
inductive justification of induction can be deployed to rationally convince an opponent.
What is crucial here is the dialectical context. If a particular instance of successful induc-
tive inference is used to justify the general mode of inductive inference against an inductive
sceptical argument like Hume’s, then the rule circularity undermines the dialectic force of such
an argument: it gives no reason for an inductive sceptic to change their mind regarding the
point at dispute. However, if a particular instance of inductive inference is employed within
an argument to justify a second (non-identical) instance of inductive inference, then the ar-
gument may well have dialectic force against an interlocutor who is not sceptical of inductive
reasoning per se. Consider the example of using inductive arguments based upon the temporal
uniformity of nature to justify reasoning based upon spatial uniformity: in the past, distant ob-
served phenomena have regularly resembled local observed phenomena, so in the future distant
unobserved phenomena will resemble local observed phenomena. Or consider using inductive
arguments based upon spatial uniformity to justify an inductive argument for uniformity be-
tween different tokens of the same type: the properties of observed spatially distant electrons
resemble the properties of observed local electrons, so all unobserved electrons will resemble
observed electrons. Let us call such a style of reasoning inductive triangulation.1 If inductive
triangulation is deployed with the aim of defeating the inductive sceptic then it has no dialectic
force since its rule circularity means the sceptic has been given no extra reason to change their
mind. However, if inductive triangulation is deployed with the aim of convincing someone to
extend the licensed forms of inductive inference then there is no dialectally problematic rule
circularity.
The lesson is that, provided both parties to a dispute regarding the reliability of some mode
of inductive inference accept some form of inductive reasoning (i.e. are not inductive sceptics
like Hume), then there is no dialectally problematic rule circularity. In a scientific context it
is simply unreasonable not to admit any form of inductive reasoning and thus inductive trian-
gulation is always an admissible argumentative strategy. This leads us to define unreasonable
doubt, in a scientific context, as doubt regarding the reliability of a specific instance of induc-
tive reasoning that cannot be mitigated via further inductive reasoning, including inductive
triangulation. We can then define reasonable doubt, in a scientific context, as doubt regarding
the reliability of a specific instance of inductive reasoning that can be mitigated via further
inductive reasoning, including inductive triangulation.
2.2 Three Forms of Unobservable Phenomena
Once the spectre of unreasonable doubt has been clearly distinguished from its reasonable coun-
terpart, a constructive philosophical analysis of inductive practices in science can be pursued in
1As the name suggests, this idea has much in common with the idea of ‘triangulation’ (Feigl, 1958) that has
been discussed in the context of the social and, particularly, the historical sciences (Webb et al., 1966; Wylie,
2002; Chapman and Wylie, 2014; Currie, 2018). Our usage is, however, somewhat more specific since it relates
to distinct modes of inductive reasoning, rather than simply distinct lines of evidence.
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isolation from Hume’s problem. The question of particular relevance is the relationship between
the observed and the unobserved. In particular, can we find strategies for inductive triangu-
lation to validate such inferences. To pose this question precisely we will require a number of
further distinctions.
The first and most basic is between the data gleaned from a particular experiment or obser-
vation and the general class of observable phenomena about which scientists may reasonably
draw conclusions, given the data. Consider the canonical exemplar of Galileo’s observation of
the phase of Venus: the data would be the particular spots of light that Galileo saw through his
telescope and the observable phenomena would be the phases of Venus themselves. In principle
both of these are observable in the sense of visually accessible. In general, there being no need
to privilege sight above the other senses, we can think of observables as physical quantities
whose value can be directly discerned via the senses. The important difference here between
data and phenomena is that the data are idiosyncratic to a specific experimental context but
the phenomena are not (Bogen and Woodward, 1988). In the case we are considering here, both
the data and phenomena are observable but, while the data is actually observed, the observable
phenomena are not. We can have reasonable inductive doubts about both data and phenomena.
What if Galileo’s telescope was faulty? What if he had observed Venus in an atypical part of
its orbit? In each case such reasonable doubts are mitigated precisely by inductive triangula-
tion: testing the telescope on different celestial objects, re-observing the phases of Venus at a
different time of the year.
Whilst observable phenomena were often indeed the focus of Renaissance astronomy, most
of modern science is built upon inferences regarding unobservable phenomena. In particular,
as powerfully argued by Massimi (2007), building on the original work on data and phenomena
due to Bogen and Woodward (1988), such unobservable phenomena are the subject of almost
all experimental practice in modern particle physics. The main focus of this section is to
differentiate three different types of unobservable phenomena (see Fig. 1). The first, and
most basic, are unobservable phenomena that are manipulable. Consider another canonical
experiment: the Stern-Gerlach experiment. Here the data are spots on a particular screen and
the phenomenon is the spin of the electron. This is an unobservable phenomenon in the sense
that it is not a physical quantity whose value can be directly discerned via the senses. However,
the spin of the electron clearly is a physical quantity whose value can be indirectly discerned.
Moreover, although we cannot of course change the numerical value of the electron spin, it is a
vector quantity and via experimental apparatus like the Stern-Gerlach set-up we can change the
orientation of the spin. The manipulation of (tokens of) the relevant unobservable phenomena
is in turn an important part of the story about how, again via inductive triangulation, we can
mitigate reasonable doubts regarding the inferences from experimental data to unobservable
phenomena.
In general terms, unobservable phenomena that are manipulable (a) correspond to phe-
nomena to which we have ‘two way’ causal access. That is, we can probe the phenomena via
a suitable mediating system, and the phenomena can ‘push-back’ via such a system. Whilst
much of modern physical science does indeed focus on such phenomena, it would be premature
to terminate our analysis here. Rather, moving beyond particle physics into the realm of as-
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Phenomena
Observable Unobservable
Manipulable (a) Unmanipulable
Accessible (b) Inaccessible (c)
Figure 1: Diagram Illustrating the three forms of unobservable phenomena.
trophysics and cosmology it is obviously the case that the unobservable phenomena of interest
are unmanipulable. Usually this is because they are very far away, happened a long time ago,
or are simply far too big. The phenomenon of a black hole merger as detected via gravitational
waves is perhaps the most vivid recent example of unobservable, unmanipulable phenomena
but it is not difficult to come up with a host of other examples.2 The story about how our
inductive inferences about such phenomena are validated is often a more complex one than in
the case of manipulable phenomena. However, it is noteworthy that, once more, scientists can
and do employ a wider variety of inductive triangulation strategies.
Unobservable, unmanipulable phenomena can themselves be further differentiated on the
basis of whether or not we have ‘one way’ causal access or not. That is, whether or not such
phenomena have discernible physical effects on observable systems to which we have access.
We thus have two further forms of unobservable phenomena, those that are unmanipulable and
accessible (b) and those that are unmanipulable and inaccessible (c). Black hole mergers are
accessible in the relevant sense. Examples of phenomena that are inaccessible in principle, at
least according to current physics, include the physics of black holes behind the event horizon
and all physical phenomena outside our past-light cone. There are also, of course, examples
that are physically inaccessible in practice. The two examples that will be discussed in detail in
this paper are the photonic physics of stellar nucleosynthesis and Hawking radiation associated
with black hole event horizons. In such cases the relevant phenomena are in principle accessible,
however the relevant signal is vanishingly small and so in practice we are never likely to be able
to measure it. How can we ever expect to learn about such phenomena through observation or
experiment? Would not inductive inferences regarding such phenomena always be subject to a
quite devastating and reasonable form of doubt? How can we construct inductive triangulation
procedures to mitigate such doubt? Such questions will be taken up in Sections 3 and 4 of the
paper in the context of the examples of stellar nucleosynthesis and Hawking radiation. Before
then we must provide a final piece of philosophical machinery: an analysis of confirmation and
evidence in the context of contemporary experimental science.
2Three further examples are: the internal structure and composition of the Earth’s core as determined by
measurements at the Earth’s surface of type P and S seismic waves; the existence of exoplanets as determined by
measurements of radial velocity of stars with respect to the Earth; and the value of the cosmological constant.
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2.3 Experimental Evidence and External Validation
Our focus here is on the factors that influence the strength of support that experimental evi-
dence can offer for a theory or model describing unobservable phenomena. In all cases, what is
crucial to the strength of the relevant inferences is an extrapolation from a manipulated system
that is the subject of the experiment (‘the source’) to a further class of unmanipulated (but in
some cases potentially manipulable) systems that display the relevant unobservable phenomena
(‘the target’). A simple example is given by experiments designed to learn about the iron con-
tent in the core of the earth by superheating a sample of iron in a lab using lasers (Konoˆpkova´
et al., 2016; Dobson, 2016). The experiments were carried out in the lab using samples of iron
that are placed in a laser-heated diamond-anvil cell. The pressure and temperature to which
the iron samples were subjected were specifically matched to those relevant to the cores of
Mercury-sized to Earth-sized planets. Iron in the core of Mercury-sized to Earth-sized planets
is the target, the iron in the lab is the source. Consider a particular theory of geophysics set
out in terms of the predicted phenomenon of the thermal conductivity displayed by the iron in
the core. In what circumstances can we take evidence regarding thermal conductivity drawn
from the experiment on the source system to support theory regarding the target phenomena?
And what determines the strength of the support? Such questions are usually posed in terms
of the idea of external validation, which will be worthwhile discussing in some detail.
After a long period of relative neglect, the philosophy of experimental physics is now the
subject of an extensive literature (Hacking et al., 1983; Galison et al., 1987; Franklin, 1989;
Franklin and Perovic, 2019). One of the most significant points established in such discussions
is that, in and of itself, an experiment need not teach us anything, even about the system that
is being directly manipulated. Rather, an experiment is only genuinely probative of the system
that is being experimented on when it has been internally validated through the establishment
of, for instance, the reliability of the apparatus and the robustness of the experimental pro-
tocol. Such a process of internal validation can be understood precisely in terms of the idea
of mitigation of reasonable doubt discussed earlier. In practice many elements of the internal
validation of an experiment take the form of explicit ‘auxiliary hypotheses’; statements relating
to instrumentation or other background assumptions that are needed to support any inferences
from the observational statements gained through the experiment. Also significant is the role of
more practical, sometimes tacit, experimental knowledge in internal validation. Experimenters
are embedded in a scientific tradition that includes complex protocols for conducting a given
experiment type in a valid manner. Finally, in addition to auxiliary hypotheses and experimen-
tal tradition, internal validation typically involves some consideration of statistical error. That
is, when the system being experimented on is assumed to be stochastic or subject to random
external fluctuations, experimenters need to establish that the properties attributed to it are,
to the relevant degree, typical of its stable state, rather than statistical aberrations. For the
most part this form of validation is very difficult to achieve for a single system. Thus, multiple
suitably similar systems are experimented upon. In each case the strategies for achieving in-
ternal validation, and thus mitigating reasonable doubt, are inductive. However, they need not
involve inductive triangulation. That is, the same form of inductive reasoning that is involved
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in making inferences about the source system based upon the experimental data might be used
to internally validate the experiment itself.
External validation is then mitigation of reasonable doubt regarding whether the source
system is relevantly probative of the second, unmanipulated, target system or class of sys-
tems. Similarly to internal validation, external validation involves a combination of auxiliary
statements, often from well established scientific theory, practical experimental knowledge, and
statistical reasoning. However, unlike internal validation, in the case of external validation
there is typically a requirement for inductive triangulation at the heart of the mitigation of
the relevant reasonable doubt. The principal reason for this is that typically the source-target
inference requires an appeal to intra-type uniformity: the experiment on the source system is
taken to be relevantly probative of the target phenomena on the basis that they are tokens
of the same type of substance. By what means can one mitigate reasonable doubt regarding
the general pattern of such an inference? If one is confronted by a sceptic regarding inductive
inferences based upon intra-type uniformity, how can one respond? In the context of such an
opponent there is the obvious danger of rule circularity of a dialectically undermining sort.
Consider for instance justifying the inference from the particular iron atoms in the source
to iron atoms in the target based upon intra-type uniformity between the relevant nucleons
and electrons. The pattern of inference which we are seeking to justify is now itself involved
in the justificatory argument. The argument thus provides no dialectic force against the intra-
type uniformity sceptic since its rule circularity means the sceptic has been given no extra
reason to change their mind. The key point here is that, for the doubt to be reasonable in
such circumstances, our interlocutor must admit to some forms of inductive reasoning. Thus
we can mitigate general, reasonable doubt regarding intra-type uniformity in a dialectically
convincing way by invoking inductive inferences built upon spatial or temporal uniformity.
These electrons resemble other electrons because there is an assumed spatial uniformity between
local phenomena and distant phenomena. This sample of iron in the lab is like iron in the core
of the earth in the relevant respects because past experiments and observations have been used
to calibrate the relevant experimental parameters.
It is important to note here that the manipulability and accessibility of the target system
does not in and of itself tell us anything about the limits to such external validation processes.
There is nothing in principle that tells us that external validation for manipulable target systems
is easier to achieve for accessible target systems nor, moreover, that such validation will even
always be easier for accessible over inaccessible systems. The degree to which reasonable doubt
can be mitigated via inductive triangulation depends upon contingent features specific to the
experiment, the source and target phenomena in question, and various theoretical and historical
circumstances.
We are now finally in a position to set out our stance regarding the limits of experimental
knowledge. We take it that such limits are set by the mitigation of reasonable doubt – that
is, the availability of inductive strategies for internally and externally validating source-target
inferences. When reasonable doubt has been partially mitigated a theory can be said to be
well supported, and a scientist is justified to treat the empirical consequences of the theory
as likely to be true, in the relevant domain. Inductive triangulation may be required in such
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a mitigation process, but it also may not. When reasonable doubt has been almost entirely
mitigated a theory can be said to be established, and a scientist is justified to treat the empirical
consequences of the theory as true, in the relevant domain. Plausibly, inductive triangulation
will always be required in such a mitigation process. In neither case is the issue of inductive
scepticism, and thus unreasonable doubt, relevant.
Our notion of an established theory closely resembles what Dawid (2019) calls ‘conclusive
confirmation’, which he defines as when a “theory has been established to be [empirically]
viable in a given regime beyond reasonable doubt” (p. 105). Whereas Dawid leaves reasonable
doubt undefined, we propose to explicitly define reasonable doubt as doubt that is amenable to
mitigation based upon inductive reasoning. Reasonable doubt in this sense obviously specifically
excludes inductive doubt, but is also defined such that it excludes doubt based upon Cartesian
scepticism or radical social constructivism regarding experimental knowledge.3 Our point is
not that such doubts are unreasonable per se, but rather that they are unreasonable in the
context of an analysis of the epistemology of actual scientific practice, a context in which the
acceptance of at least some form of inductive reasoning is a methodological sine qua non.4
As already noted, the manipulability and accessibility of the target phenomena does not
in and of itself constrain the potential for the mitigation of reasonable doubt, and thus the
potential for a theory regarding the phenomena to be well supported or established. In principle,
it is perfectly possible for theories regarding inaccessible phenomena to be taken to be well
supported or established based upon a suitably externally validated experiment and (where
necessary) inductive triangulation strategy. Whether and how this is possible in principle will
be the focus of the remainder of the paper.
3 Case Study I: Stellar Nucleosynthesis
Our first case study chosen to help demarcate the limits of experimental knowledge is the
model of stellar nucleosynthesis – that is, the model of the nuclear reactions that form the
primary sources of energy production inside the core of a star. What makes this case study
particularly salient in the context of our discussion is that it both involves all three forms of
unobservable phenomena, (a)–(c), and a process of external validation built upon inductive
triangulation. Furthermore, the model of stellar nucleosynthesis is supported by validated
experimental evidence of such quality and quantity that it is plausibly taken to be established.
That is, relevant reasonable doubts have been almost entirely mitigated, and thus scientists
are justified to treat the empirical consequences of the theory as true, in the relevant domain.
Before we consider these epistemological claims in detail, let us consider the model of stellar
nucleosynthesis as described in contemporary physics.
For main sequence stars the model of stellar nucleosynthesis consists of two principal reac-
tions that take place in the stellar core: the proton-proton (pp) chain; and the carbon-nitrogen-
3That at least some forms of social constructivism can be understood as unreasonable doubt is evidenced
by, for instance, the sentiment that: “a sufficiently determined critic can always find a reason to dispute any
alleged “result”’ (MacKenzie, 1989). An instructive summary of the debates regarding constructivism about
experimental knowledge is given in §1.2 of (Franklin and Perovic, 2019).
4There is thus some similarity between what we are proposing and the ‘response’ to Cartesian scepticism
deployed by epistemic contextualism (Rysiew, 2016).
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oxygen (CNO) cycle (Rose, 1998). In stars such as our Sun, the pp chain is the dominant source
of energy production, and transforms hydrogen, via deuterium, into helium, with energy re-
leased in the form of gamma rays. Less dominant in stars the size of our Sun (but becoming
more dominant in larger stars), the CNO cycle also transforms hydrogen into helium, but does
so via a catalytic process. In this process a carbon nucleus sequentially captures four protons.
By this capture process, and two associated weak nuclear decays, the carbon nucleus is trans-
formed to a nitrogen, and then an oxygen, nucleus before returning to carbon after releasing
a helium nucleus, with the release of energy in the form of gamma rays at each step along the
way.
The most significant feature of these processes for our purposes is that they occur deep
within the stellar core. The high energy photons that result from these processes are released
into the dense plasma of the stellar interior and so, due to their strong interaction with matter,
have a mean free path of about the order of a centimetre. The origin of the stellar photons
that we observe from the Earth is always then the stellar surface layers and thus, with regard
to photons at least, processes going on within the interior of stars are in practice entirely
inaccessible. Thus obtaining direct photonic observational evidence for the nuclear processes
at the stellar core is simply not possible. As a result, these processes are unmanipulable,
and (photonically) inaccessible. We thus have an example of the third most removed form of
unobservable phenomena (c). Despite this, so we will argue below, the model describing such
phenomena is so well supported by externally validated experimental evidence that there is
little if any room for reasonable doubt. Scientists are thus justified in treating the empirical
consequences of the theory as true in the relevant domain. Let us consider the various sources
of experimental evidence in turn.
To begin with, any possible source of stellar energy production is constrained by two factors.
Firstly, isotope abundances calculated from transition rates between isotopes in any putative
process of energy production are constrained by the isotope abundances we observe in space,
which themselves vary across ‘old’ and ‘new’ regions of the universe, and between stars and
interstellar space. Secondly, the rate of reaction for any putative process of energy production
is constrained by the inferred core temperatures and lifetimes of stars of different masses. We
can get a better grasp on how these constraints restrict model possibilities by considering the
role that they played in the development of the first light-element nuclear transitions proposed
as the energy source of stars (Gamow, 1935, 1938). These proposals transgressed against the
constraints by either suggesting isotope abundances mismatched to observation – in particular,
interstellar abundances of lithium, beryllium, and helium isotopes – or by containing reactions
that are, based on known cross-sections, too rapid or too slow to match inferred stellar lifetimes.
In fact, any reaction that involves the capture of protons by light elements will be too fast, and
any reaction that involves the capture of protons by heavy elements will be too slow.
The two key reactions we now take to comprise stellar nucleosynthesis in main sequence
stars, the pp chain (Bethe and Critchfield, 1938) and the CNO cycle (Bethe, 1939; von Weizsa¨cker,
1939), are much more promising candidates for stellar energy production precisely because they
have the right sort of reaction rate to match inferred stellar lifetimes and produce no extra iso-
topes as by-products, other than the hydrogen-to-helium transition, to match observed isotope
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abundances. Moreover, terrestrial measurements of nuclear reaction cross-sections indicate that
the CNO cycle is highly temperature-sensitive, much more so than the pp chain, and for peak
efficiency requires temperatures higher than the core of stars such as our Sun. Thus, for such
stars, the pp chain is the main contributor to energy production, and the CNO cycle gains
precedence in much larger stars.
Let us consider the structure of the relevant inferences using the philosophical toolkit we
developed earlier in the paper. As already noted, photonic phenomena relating to stellar nucle-
osynthesis are unmanipulable and inaccessible. The observational and experimental evidence
that we have thus described is only able to support the theory of the phenomena based upon
quite complicated modes of inference. For the first constraint, measurements of isotope abun-
dances consist of the observation of spectra from both stellar surfaces and in interstellar space,
which are cross-referenced to terrestrially observed spectra. We thus have two types of source
phenomena: first, phenomena of the stellar surfaces and phenomena in interstellar space, each
of which are accessible but not manipulable (b); and, second, the terrestrial atomic systems that
are experimented upon to measure their spectra (a). The inference from these source systems
to our target system, nuclear reactions in the stellar interior, is then validated via a range of
independently established theories. In particular, theories relating to the origin of interstellar
matter in both the explosion of stars via supernovae and from the big bang and, moreover, the
atomic structure of elements; although it is worth noting that the two complementary theories
of the origin of interstellar matter are themselves partly justified by an empirically adequate
model of nucleosynthesis. It is of course hugely significant here that in such inferences we must
assume that the experiments to determine the spectra of terrestrial isotopes are probative of
stellar surface and interstellar isotopes. This is precisely the intra-type uniformity assumption
that we have discussed extensively already.
For the second constraint, stellar core temperatures and lifetimes are attained from the
inferred relationship between stellar mass and surface temperature owing to the standard in-
terpretation of the Hertzsprung-Russell (HR) diagram. The HR diagram is a plot of observed
luminosity against effective temperature and provides a model of stellar evolution, which itself,
as above, relies on assumptions about stellar nucleosynthesis. Given the narrative of stellar
evolution derived from the HR diagram, observations of relative stellar luminosities in globular
clusters, which contain stars assumed to be all of the same age, can provide good estimates for
the sorts of time scales that stars of different masses live. These astronomical observations can
then be complemented with laboratory evidence (usually from particle accelerators) for nuclear
reaction rates and cross-sections to provide constraints on stellar core temperatures and stellar
lifetimes. These in turn place constraints on proposed nuclear reactions in the stellar core
and thus the empirical viability of models of stellar nucleosynthesis. Once more we have two
types of ‘source’ phenomena: astrophysical observations of phenomena that are accessible but
not manipulable (b); and the terrestrial nuclear phenomena that are manipulated in particle
accelerators (a). And once more inferences from these source systems to our target system,
the interior of stars, is then validated via a range of independently established theories. It is
important to emphasise that at the heart of this chain of reasoning is the intra-type uniformity
assumption, as before, but also the spatial (and, by extension, temporal) uniformity of the
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strong and weak nuclear force determining the nuclear reaction rates. In addition, there is a
further appeal to temporal uniformity in assuming that the observed stars are tokens of the
same types as the stars in the past that were the progenitors of the interstellar matter. Without
such uniformity principles, the inference from the terrestrial to astrophysical phenomena could
not be justified. Ultimately, if these inferences are doubted, both lines of evidence can be called
into question. Thus, the non-rule-circular defence of the intra-type uniformity assumption is
an essential ‘backstop’ against the reasonable form of inductive scepticism we have discussed
earlier.
Together we take these two lines of evidence to be sufficient to categorise the model of
stellar nucleosynthesis as well supported. That is, given such evidence, scientists are justified
in treating the empirical consequences of the model as likely to be true, in the relevant domain.
There are, however, plausibly still reasons to doubt the model, in part because of the level of
background theory mediation and the lack of empirical access to photonic phenomena in the
interior of stars.
The final piece of evidence, that we take to establish the model as empirically viable in its
domain, beyond reasonable doubt, involves a means of gaining access to non-photonic phenom-
ena in the interior of stars. However, once more, crucially this evidence is only in fact able
to support the model when combined with terrestrial experiments. We have made a point so
far of the fact that obtaining direct photonic observational evidence of the nuclear reactions in
stellar cores is not possible. However, on account of the fact that the neutrinos produced in
the nuclear reactions in the stellar core interact so weakly with matter, it is highly probable
for them to escape the star without interacting, allowing us to detect on earth stellar neutri-
nos directly from the stellar core. The neutrino flux from the reactions in the interior of the
Sun can be observed at Earth and compared to the theoretical value of neutrino flux deduced
from the theorised energy production process in the solar core. Fascinatingly, the quantita-
tive correspondence desired did not obtain when the first solar neutrino detection experiments
where conducted (Davis et al., 1968). Rather, it is only after the hypothesis of neutrino os-
cillations that solar neutrino experiments sensitive to the different neutrino flavours could be
devised (Ahmad et al., 2001). With these solar neutrino experiments, along with subsequent
terrestrial neutrino experiments, the predicted solar neutrino flux could be corrected and the
correspondence between observation and prediction obtained (Liccardo et al., 2018). Our story
is thus partially modified from the above. The target phenomena are neutrino reactions in the
stellar core which are accessible but not manipulable (b). The source phenomena are solar and
atmospheric neutrinos, as well as neutrinos in terrestrial accelerators, that are manipulable (a)
and have been established as displaying oscillation. Again, there is an appeal to intra-type
uniformity – neutrinos on earth are like neutrinos in the stellar core in the relevant respects –
and spatial uniformity – the weak nuclear force is invariant under spatial translations – at the
heart of the reasoning.
In summary, the model of stellar nucleosynthesis provides an example of unmanipulable
and inaccessible phenomena (c) that was well supported before means of access via neutrino
experiments were found. Plausibly, it is this access that established the model as empirically
viable in its domain, beyond reasonable doubt. However, this evidence, like the earlier evidence,
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Figure 2: Inductive triangulation between different sources of astrophysical evidence.
relies crucially upon inferences from the terrestrial to the astrophysical grounded upon inductive
evidence for intra-type uniformity. Moreover, the realm of phenomena established for stellar
nucleosynthesis includes inaccessible target phenomena such as that relating to photons in the
interior of stars. This point is of particular significance in the context of black holes and
analogue experiments considered in the next section.
4 Case Study II: Hawking Radiation in Analogue Black Holes
Hawking radiation (Hawking, 1975) is a thermal phenomenon that is predicted to be generically
associated with black holes. In practice, it is impossible to obtain direct experimental evidence
of Hawking radiation in astrophysical black holes. This is because for astrophysical black holes
the temperature is vastly smaller than the cosmic microwave background, and so most likely
outside the range of even the most fantastically sensitive future telescopes. Despite the absence
of any direct experimental evidence, Hawking radiation is widely believed to be actual by
theoretical physicists.
Not long after the original derivation of Hawking radiation, it was proposed by Unruh (1981)
that a similar thermal effect might exist in the context of sound in fluid systems. In particular,
Unruh showed that the key elements of Hawking’s calculation could be re-applied in the context
of a semi-classical model of sound in fluids. An alternative medium for constructing acoustic
black holes, that obeys equations of the same form as those of a fluid in an appropriate limit, is
given by a Bose-Einstein Condensate (BEC) (Garay et al., 2000). There are now a huge number
of potential analogue realisations of the Hawking effect: phonons in superfluid helium-3, ‘slow
light’ in moving media, travelling refractive index interfaces in nonlinear optical media, laser
pulses in nonlinear dielectric media.5 Recent years have seen a proliferation of experiments
designed to probe the phenomenon of Hawking radiation via analogue black hole systems.
Reports on these experiments include claims of observation of classical, thermal aspects of
Hawking radiation in an analogue white hole created using surface water waves (Weinfurtner
5See (Jacobson and Volovik, 1998; Philbin et al., 2008; Belgiorno et al., 2010; Unruh and Schu¨tzhold, 2012;
Liberati et al., 2012; Nguyen et al., 2015; Jacquet, 2018).
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et al., 2011, 2013) and experiments leading to the observation of the quantum effect via the
correlation spectrum of entanglement across an acoustic horizon in a BEC (Steinhauer, 2016a;
de Nova et al., 2019).6
In such experiments, the target phenomenon is Hawking radiation in astrophysical black
holes. This is clearly an unobservable phenomenon of the unmanipulable, inaccessible type (c).
It has been claimed in the literature that analogue experiments can in principle provide induc-
tive support for the theoretical models of such phenomena on the basis of external validation
via ‘universality arguments’ (Dardashti et al., 2017, 2019; The´bault, 2019).7 The paradigmatic
model of such arguments is the analysis of Unruh and Schu¨tzhold (2005) who provide theoreti-
cal reasons to expect that, under certain conditions, any modifications to the Hawking flux by
high energy modes will be negligible.8 Unruh and Schu¨tzhold show that a wide family of trans-
Planckian effects can be factored into the calculation of Hawking radiation via a non-trivial
dispersion relation. To lowest order and given certain modelling assumptions, Hawking radia-
tion, both astrophysical and acoustic, is independent of the details of the underlying physics. A
significant distinction that can be made in this context is between robustness and universality
(Batterman, 2000; Gryb et al., 2019). Robustness is the insensitivity of a phenomenon under a
token-level variation with respect to different possible micro-physics in a single type of system.
Universality is the insensitivity of a phenomenon under a type-level variation between systems
with fundamentally different material constitution (e.g. BECs and a classical fluid). Given
these definitions, we can plausibly take the work of Unruh and Schu¨tzhold to be an argument
for both the robustness and the universality of the Hawking effect.
The argument for inductive support for the model of black hole Hawking radiation based
upon analogue experiments validated via universality arguments thus has a very similar form
to that for other inferences about inaccessible astrophysical phenomena. In particular, we have
a reliance on a principle of uniformity between a manipulable unobservable phenomenon in
a source system (analogue Hawking radiation) and an inaccessible unobservable phenomenon
in a target system (black hole Hawking radiation). Such an inference closely parallels that
between, for instance, nuclear processes in terrestrial particle accelerators and in the interior
of stars. In particular, with regard to photonic processes at least, the interior of a star is
inaccessible for precisely the same reason as the event horizon of a black hole: in both cases the
relevant flux of photons is vanishingly small. The contrast is that whereas in more conventional
experiments the source system is of the same type as the target system, here the reliance is
6For more on surface water wave experiments see (Rousseaux et al., 2008, 2010; Michel and Parentani, 2014;
Unruh, 2014; Euve´ et al., 2016; Torres et al., 2017; Euve´ et al., 2018). For further results and discussion of
Steinhauer’s BEC experiments see (Steinhauer, 2014, 2015; Finke et al., 2016; Steinhauer, 2016b; de Nova et al.,
2018; Leonhardt, 2018).
7This account of ‘confirmation via analogue simulation’ draws heavily from the literature on the philosophy
of computer simulation, in particular the work of Winsberg (1999, 2009, 2010). Subsequent analysis has included
extensions in terms of formal frameworks for confirmation theory (Dardashti et al., 2019; Feldbacher-Escamilla
and Gebharter, forthcoming), further exploration of the connection to conventional experiments and computer
simulations (Boge, 2018) and a (contentious) discussion of a supposed circularity in the argument (Crowther
et al., 2019). We will return to this last point of controversy shortly. An excellent overview which includes
discussion of many relevant issues can be found in (Bartha, 2019, §5.1).
8For further work on these issues, using a range of different methodologies, see for example (Corley, 1998;
Himemoto and Tanaka, 2000; Barcelo´ et al., 2009; Coutant et al., 2012).
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on the source being in the same universality class as the target system. Thus, there is, prima
facie, only a fundamental difference between the two forms of inference if one thinks that there
is a fundamental difference between intra-type regularity principles, as embodied by natural
kind arguments, and inter-type regularities, as embodied by universality arguments.
It will now prove worthwhile to consider a recent attempt to undermine this argument for
the inductive support of models of black hole Hawking radiation via the combination of uni-
versality arguments and analogue experiments. In particular, Crowther et al. (2019, p.1) have
claimed that to make such an argument one must assume “the physical adequacy of the mod-
elling framework used to describe the inaccessible target system” and that this implies that
“arguments to the conclusion that analogue experiments can yield confirmation for phenomena
in [inaccessible] target systems, such as Hawking radiation in black holes, beg the question”.
As stated, it is a little difficult to know what to make of the argument of Crowther et al. In
particular, they talk about “begging the question” as the “inductive analogue” of the deductive
fallacy of the same name. That is, the premise circular version of circular reasoning when one
“assume[s] the conclusion that [one] is trying to establish” (p.20). However, as we have seen
already, as an ampliative inference, inductive reasoning simply cannot be premise circular: all
premise circular arguments are non-ampliative by definition. When seen as a relation of induc-
tive support, confirmation is always based upon a combination of evidence and assumptions
that is defeasible. Thus it is incoherent to claim that an inductive argument for confirmation
via analogue simulation is premise circular. An argument simply cannot be both inductive and
premise circular.
A reconstruction of the argument of Crowther et al. in coherent terms can be achieved by
reference to the idea of rule circularity. Although we take this reconstruction argument to still
not be convincing, it is at least consistent. What we would take to be the essence of their point
is as follows. In order to externally validate the inference from source to target system via
universality arguments, one must make inferences based upon a uniformity principle of a novel
kind. That is, inter-type uniformity between accessible and inaccessible phenomena. However,
it is the reliability of precisely such a uniformity principle that is itself in question when we
are trying to ascertain external validity of analogue experiments. Hence there is indeed a form
of rule circularity implicit in the argument for confirmation via analogue simulation. Recall,
however, that whether or not rule circularity is dialectically undermining depends upon the
context of the debate. Evidently, Crowther et al. are not assuming the position of induc-
tive sceptics and offering an argument based upon unreasonable doubt. This means that they
should not rule out strategies for inductive triangulation. In fact, that is precisely what has
been implicit in the arguments being criticised (Dardashti et al., 2017, 2019; The´bault, 2019).
Consistent between all these accounts is a claim supported by a combination of multiple inde-
pendent analogue experiments, and thus an enumerative mode of inductive reasoning, that is
crucial to support the case for black hole Hawking radiation based upon analogue experiments.
In performing multiple successful analogue experiments one is providing inductive evidence for
inter-type uniformity between different accessible phenomena. This provides inductive trian-
gulation for the mode of inductive inference that relies upon inter-type uniformity between
accessible and inaccessible phenomena. Unless of course one is an inductive sceptic, this is
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Figure 3: Inductive triangulation between analogue experiments.
evidently not rule circular in any dialectically problematic sense.
There are however, still two reasonable grounds to object. The first reason for reasonable
doubt that we might take Crowther et al. to have in mind is a worry about inductive inferences
regarding inaccessible target systems in general. Here it is worth keeping in mind our analysis
of stellar nucleosynthesis in the previous section. Clearly there are inaccessible target systems
about which we can formulate theories and models that can be well supported by combinations
of different lines of evidence. To exclude confirmation of inaccessible target systems in principle
would be to eliminate a variety of well supported and established theories and models in con-
temporary physics. A second reasonable objection that Crowther et al. might point to is the
unusual form of inter-type uniformity that is being relied upon. However, as they themselves
note, what counts as the same kind of system is to some extent context dependent. Moreover,
clearly we can and do make precisely such style of inferences in a range of condensed mat-
ter contexts using Wilsonian universality arguments (Thouless, 1989; Pru¨fer et al., 2018; Erne
et al., 2018; Eigen et al., 2018). There are thus a range of avenues for inductive triangulation of
these inferences. Still, Crowther et al. might wish to put forward a specific scepticism regarding
the universality arguments for Hawking radiation in particular. In this context, it is important
to note that the relation of inductive support between analogue experiments and astrophysical
Hawking radiation only relies upon the university arguments having non-trivial (i.e. probability
neither zero nor one) credence (Dardashti et al., 2019). Whilst reasonable scepticism regarding
these arguments (Gryb et al., 2019) could certainly justify setting a relatively low credence,
it is surely just as unreasonable to believe them to be certainly false, as it is to believe them
to be certainly true. Plausibly, a low credence in the universality arguments would mean that
inductive evidence from analogue experiments cannot render conclusions about astrophysical
black holes ‘well supported’, no matter how many such experiments are carried out. However,
such scepticism does not block the relation of inductive support per se. It is thus difficult to
resist the conclusion that, pace Crowther et al., analogue experiments can in principle pro-
vide support for (and thus stand in confirmation relations to) theories and models describing
inaccessible target systems, like black holes.
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In summary, to rule out inductive support for astrophysical Hawking radiation based upon
analogue experiments is unreasonable. However, for this support to be strengthened, and
reasonable doubts mitigated, both stronger universality arguments and a new generation of
analogue experiments showing Hawking radiation in diverse media are needed.
5 Conclusion
The foregoing arguments and analysis notwithstanding, even if a wide range of analogue ex-
periments were successfully conducted and the relevant universality arguments significantly
strengthened, black hole Hawking radiation would certainly not be something that is beyond
reasonable doubt (or ‘conclusively confirmed’).9 The upshot is that the probative value of the
next generation of analogue experiments in part depends upon scientists ability to combine
them with other analogue experiments, universality arguments, and conventional experimental
evidence to develop a stronger case of inductive triangulation. In this way, looking to the future,
inductive triangulation allows for the possibility of analogue experiments to play a role, when
combined with appropriate conventional experimental results, in establishing new theories.
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